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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the quality of analysts' forecasts before and during 
stock market crashes in the U.S. from 1985 to 2007. Our results indicate that on 
the average analysts provide less accurate forecasts before crashes than they do 
in the long window periods that cover the crashes periods, and that the forecasts 
are the worst during the crashes periods. In addition, the study of analyst forecast 
dispersion does not yield observable patterns or signals to forecast stock market 
crashes, which suggests that the increase in the variance of the analyst forecast 
error before crashes originates mainly from the surprising actual earning figures 
released at fiscal year-ends. Finally, we document a positive relationship between 
analyst forecast dispersion and excess stock returns in the period that covers 
2000-2002，s tech-bubble burst, which is opposite to the finding in the literature 
on the same issue over the whole sample. This positive relationship, unlike a 
negative one, gives rise to the possibility that dispersion in analysts' forecasts 
may proxy for risk during the crashes periods. However, our results from the 
traditional Fama-French time series regression demonstrate that dispersion only 
explains an insignificant portion of the variation in stock returns, inspiring the 
search for appropriate forms of dispersion to be included in the Fama-French 
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1. Introduction 
The information contained in the intersection of the Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S), the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
and Standard and Poor's Compustat datasets provides an ideal platform for 
researchers to study the association between analysts' forecasts and the 
corresponding stock performance. One direction of such studies centers on the 
linkage between analyst forecast accuracy and analysts' characteristics. Clement 
(1999) discovers that forecast accuracy is positively associated with analysts' 
experience and negatively related to numbers of firms and industries followed by 
the analysts. Hong, Kubik and Solomn (2000) further explore the career concerns 
behind analysts' herding behavior and claim that inexperienced analysts are more 
likely to be terminated for inaccurate forecasts and that they are less likely to 
issue timely forecasts. Clement and Tse (2005) also investigate analysts' herding 
behavior and find that experienced analysts are more likely to issue bold 
forecasts which incorporate private information more completely. Apart from 
career concerns, optimism in analysts' forecasts also coincides with higher 
trading commissions. Jackson (2005) argues that analysts face a tradeoff between 
telling the truth to build reputation and misleading the public with 
over-optimistic forecasts to generate more trade for their brokerage firms. 
The other direction of such studies is built on the price-optimism model set 
forth by Miller (1977) to analyze the relationship between dispersion in analysts' 
forecasts and security returns. The key finding is that the wider the dispersion of 
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analysts' forecasts, the further the market price deviates from the true value of 
the stock, and the lower its future return. These studies also utilize Fama-French 
multifactor models (1992，1993, and 1996) to scrutinize the impact of analyst 
forecast dispersion (AFD hereafter) on the excess stock returns (ESR hereafter). 
For example, Diether et al. (2002) analyze a sample from 1983 to 2000 and 
document a negative relationship between AFD and ESR. However, their results 
clearly reject the notion that the dispersion in analysts' forecasts can proxy for 
risk. Sadka, Ronnie and Scherbina, (2007) follow Diether et al. (2002)'s 
methodology to sort stocks into different dispersion groups and find that high 
dispersion in analysts' forecasts coincides with high trading cost, and these 
less-liquid stocks are the most overpriced in the market. 
Other related studies include Benrud (2007)，s search of exogenous 
parameters that significantly influence analysts' herding behavior, Hope (2003)，s 
examination of the relationship between the level of firms' accounting policy 
disclosures and forecast dispersion, and Dische (2002)，s analysis on the 
profitability of applying AFD as an earning momentum strategy in the German 
stock market. 
All the above researches utilize a full-sample of the I/B/E/S dataset 
especially consensus-forecasts contained in the I/B/E/S Summary History File to 
study different issues related to analysts' forecasts. However, little work has been 
done to investigate analysts' forecasts in a sub-sample that covers a particular 
historical episode. Ho et al. (1995) take a step in this direction to closely track 
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analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion after options listing, and find 
improvement in accuracy and increase in dispersion following the event. Chahine 
(2004)'s paper concentrates on preannouncement period and shows that the 
abnormal return at the formal announcement is negatively related to the AFD 
after the preannouncement. The insights provided by these studies are twofold. 
First, the comparison of analysts' forecasts surrounding particular time periods or 
events to those in the long-run may possibly yield hints on the relationship 
between analysts' behavior and the events. Second, the significance of such 
relationship can be verified by controlling firm-specific variables such as market 
capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and price-earning ratio. 
Inspired by the above studies, we start with a vital question: If analysts' 
opinions contain crucial information about a stock's true value, should we expect 
the pattern of analysts' forecasts before stock market crashes to provide warning 
signals for the public? The scrutiny of analysts' forecasts before and during stock 
market crashes carries tremendous implications for investors who rely heavily on 
analysts' recommendations. However, there has been little empirical research 
investigating analyst forecast accuracy before and during stock market crashes 
using sub-samples of the I/B/E/S dataset. Previous studies on analysts' herding 
behavior indicate that analysts tend to agree with each other in the bullish market, 
but diverge in opinions in the bearish market (Sadka et al. (2007)). The first part 
of this thesis tries to capture evidence in support of the hypothesis that the 
herding behavior will generate considerably worse forecasts so that the analyst 
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forecast error (AFE hereafter) will be abnormally high when the crash 
approaches. 
The observation of abnormal characteristics of analysts' behavior before 
market crashes inspires us to take a closer look at AFD before stock market 
crashes. There is limited research that uses AFD as a predictive mechanism to 
study analysts' behavior before and during stock market crashes. Buchenroth and 
Jennings (1987) first study the dispersion of analysts' beliefs as an ex ante 
measure of risks. They measure AFD by the coefficient of variation instead of the 
across-analyst standard deviation, and find that AFD declines along the time 
horizon. The research on analysts' selective coverage (Das et al. (2006)) suggests 
that on the average, analysts are reluctant to release negative information 
especially when the market rises. The dispersion of financial analysts' forecasts, 
therefore, is expected to be downward biased before the crashes and gradually 
adjusted after their occurrence. The second part of this thesis examines the 
behavior of AFD three months before the crashes, seeking for clear and 
identifiable signals. 
Finally, prior studies such as Chen et al. (2001) and Diether et al. (2002) 
attempt to incorporate AFD into the traditional Fama-French asset pricing models. 
They find clear evidence that stocks with higher AFD earn significantly lower 
future returns than otherwise similar stocks. In the third part of this thesis, we 
apply Diether et al. (2002)'s portfolio strategies and regression models to a 
sub-sample of the dataset. The relationship between AFD and ESR is found to be 
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positive, which is opposite to results documented in the literature, suggesting that 
it is possible to use AFD as a risk proxy to explain ESR during stock market 
crashes. 
The layout of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 identifies the periods for the 
stock market crashes concerned in this study. Chapter 3 describes the way to 
obtain the sub-period dataset. Chapter 4 examines the performance of AFE of the 
forecasts issued in different sub-periods with two different methodologies. 
Chapter 5 plots AFD along the time horizon and tries to capture plausible signals 
for the upcoming market turmoil. Chapter 6 follows Diether et al. (2002) to seek 
for abnormal patterns in the relationship between AFD and ESR by incorporating 
AFD into the traditional Fama-French asset pricing models. Chapter 7 concludes 
the thesis. 
2. Identification of Stock Market Crashes 
There exists a rich literature concerned with financial crisis and stock market 
crash. Among these studies, however, very few have employed formal, consistent, 
and quantifiable rules to define the emergence, duration, and other structures of 
such historical episodes around which asynchronous observations can be 
consistently organized. Instead, some researchers utilize informal, complicated 
variants of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) rules to delineate 
business cycles. Other qualitative examples include Schinasi (2004)'s definition 
of financial instability and Eichengreen and Portes (1987)，s definition of 
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financial crisis. Despite limited attempts to quantitatively define financial crisis 
and stock market crash in the extant literature, there are a number of studies that 
endeavor to provide algorithms to identify stock market turning points, based on 
which the expansionary and contractionary cycles or phases of the stock market 
can be defined. Bry and Boschan (1971) are the first to use a nonparametric 
approach to partition the sampled months into mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
bull and bear subsets. Pagan and Sossounov (2003) adapt the Bry-Boschan (BB) 
algorithm by using non-smoothed price series to capture effects of large 
movements in the market. They adopt 16 months as the minimum duration of a 
whole cycle and 4 months as the minimum duration of a bull or bear phase. The 
minimum phase length is disregarded if the stock index falls or rises by 20% in a 
single month 1. 
Inspired by the discussion on the bear market in the literature, we attempt to 
modify the widely accepted Bry-Boschan (BB) algorithm to define the stock 
market crash, by capturing the most important feature of it - the acuteness of the 
index drop in the initial phase. We employ the same dating methods with BB to 
decide turning points of the market. In addition, we set up two criteria to address 
the large, acute and unexpected drop in a typical stock market crash. It is worth 
to note, however, that unlike a bear market that must span for more than 5 
months as stated in the BB algorithm, the way that the stock market crash is 
defined in this thesis is less related to duration, under the consideration that an 
‘ T h e 20% fall or rise in stock index is widely used as a rule of thumb for identifying a stock 
market cumulative movement as bullish or bearish. 
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acute market crash may or may not initiate a bear market. 
In this thesis, we use Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq 100 index, and 
Standard and Poor 500 index as the weatherglass of the U.S. stock market. By 
visual inspection of the movements of these indices, we are able to filter out 
candidates of stock market crashes in the U.S. history from 1985 to 2007.2 Table 
1 summarizes the key characters of the three indices. 
[Insert Table I here] 
2.1 Identification Criteria 
Suggested by the BB algorithm, for any stock index, there is a peak at t if 
Pt -6，Pt - i < P t � P t + i , - J Pt+6 
and there is a trough at t if 
Pt-6, . . . , Pt-i > Pt < Pt+i，.• •，Pt+6 
where Pt denotes the value of the stock index at time t. 
After identifying all the peaks and troughs, we further set up two criteria to 
help identify the stock market crashes that are concerned in our study and 
determine their starting and ending dates. Criterion A concerns the magnitude of 
the index drop during a qualified stock market crash. Criterion B concerns the 
acuteness of the drop and rebound at the starting and ending dates of the stock 
market crash, respectively. 
2 I/B/E/S Summary History File is available only after 1976. 
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Criterion A Regardless of the duration of the suspected crashes, all the 
three indices must decline by more than 30% during the 
crashes. 
Criterion B a. At the starting point, at least two of the indices reach a 
two-year peak, and at least two of the indices fall by more than 
15% in the following two months. 
b. At the ending point, at least two of the indices reach a 
two-year trough, and at least two of the indices rise by more 
than 15% in the following two months. 
2.2 Identification Results 
Under Criterion A, two crash-periods are identified from 1985 to 2007, 
which are 1987，s stock market crash and the tech-bubble burst (TBB) during 
2000 to 2002. Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 has relatively minor impacts 
on the U.S. stock market (all the indices decline less than 20%), thus it is 
excluded from our analysis. Figure I, II, and III demonstrate the movements of 
the three major U.S. stock indices on a weekly basis and the suspected stock 
market crashes from 1985 to 2007.3 
3 Dow Jones Industrial Average is divided by 3，so that it is comparable with the other two 
indices in Figure I’ II，and III. Nasdaq index 100 is available only after 1985. 
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[Insert Figure I，Figure II, and Figure III here] 
After the two stock market crashes are identified, Criterion B is applied to 
determine the starting and ending dates for the crash-periods concerned in this 
study. The results are reported in Table II. 
[Insert Table II here] 
There are three findings from Table II. First, the duration of 1987’s stock 
market crash is as short as about three months, while the TBB lasts for two and 
half years. This difference in duration provides us an opportunity to study 
analysts' behavior and their forecast quality in different types of crashes. Second, 
the starting and ending dates of the two crashes are uniformly identified no 
matter which index is used. Moreover, the Nasdaq 100 index seems to be more 
sensitive to negative market conditions compared with the other two indices. Due 
to the fact that the Nasdaq portfolio is mainly constituted of technology stocks, 
the index fluctuates more dramatically than the other two indices do, especially 
during 2000-2002's TBB. The strong signals provided by the indices before 
market crashes will give credit to analysts' work if they have access to 
substantive private information and the incentives to release negative forecasts to 
warn the public. 
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3. Data 
The I/B/E/S Detail History File contains individual analysts' estimates from 
more than 200 brokerage houses and 2000 individual analysts, and the I/B/E/S 
Summary History File consists of chronological snapshots of consensus level 
data taken from the I/B/E/S Detail History File on a monthly basis. Since the 
I/B/E/S Detail History File provides a better coverage of published estimates in 
the history, in Chapter 4 we use the I/B/E/S Detail History File to examine AFE 
before stock market crashes. For the following chapters that center on the 
dispersion of analysts' forecasts, we use the I/B/E/S Summary History File. This 
is because the Summary File contains summary statistics such as forecast mean, 
median, and the number of analysts making forecasts in the corresponding month, 
so that all information needed to calculate AFD is available. The estimates 
contained in the Summary File are collected and filtered (according to certain 
rules set by I/B/E/S) from the Detail History File on the Thursday before the 
third Friday of every month. Therefore, it is much smaller in size and contains 
most of the largest firms in the U.S.. However, robustness test conducted in prior 
researches (e.g., Diether et al. (2002)) shows that the size effect does not have 
significant impact on the results of the examination of AFD. 
3.1 Data Issue for Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4，we first exclude observations that do not use U.S. dollar as 
their earning report currency, which limits our targets to pure U.S. firms that 
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operate mainly on U.S. soil. 0.72% of the observations are deleted accordingly. 
Secondly, in order to evaluate analyst forecast accuracy in the short run, we 
follow Sadka, Ronnie and Scherbina (2007) to drop long-run estimates whose 
report date exceeds one year from the estimate date, so that only the current 
annual forecast estimates are reported. Around 40% of the observations are 
excluded from this analysis. Thirdly, observations that have missing values for 
the actual EPS or estimated EPS (which accounts for only 1.66% of the dataset) 
are excluded, since we cannot calculate and compare their forecast errors. 
Fourthly, observations whose estimate date is later than the forecast end date 
(mostly fiscal year end) are also discarded. This case is rare (which accounts for 
only 0.81% of the dataset) but the deletion of such observations is justified, 
because many U.S. companies issue their earning reports several months after the 
fiscal year end, during which analysts may release revisions of their previous 
forecasts based on the information disclosed near the fiscal year end. Given the 
fiscal year has passed and analysts may hold substantive information in this 
period, it is unfair to compare these forecasts to those made before the fiscal year 
end. Under this consideration, we only use estimates made before the fiscal year 
end. Finally, we also eliminate observations whose actual EPS or estimated EPS 
is smaller than 0.01. As a result, 0.67% of the observations are deleted. Most of 
these EPS values belong to companies that experienced large stock splits before 
the report date. In case if a company is involved in a large stock split, I/B/E/S 
will report both of the actual EPS and estimated EPS as zero and it is not possible 
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to obtain forecast errors for these observations. 
In summary, except for the exclusion of the long-run estimates, the 
accumulative percentage of the observations deleted from the original Detail 
History File is only 3.86%, which does not significantly affect our results. 
3.2 Data Issue for Chapter 5 
In Chapter 5, we define AFD as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts 
scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast. Under this definition, 
we first exclude observations of companies covered by less than two analysts. 
Secondly, if the mean earnings forecasts are zero (which accounts for 0.07% of 
the overall dataset), we follow Sadka and Scherbina (2007) to exclude such 
observations from our sample. Finally, following the conventional treatment in 
the literature, stocks with share price lower than five dollars are also excluded so 
that our results are not driven by small, illiquid stocks or by bid-ask bounce. The 
accumulative percentage of the observations deleted from the original Summary 
History File is about 28%. 
3.3 Data Issue for Chapter 6 
In Chapter 6, we use the intersection of the I/B/E/S Summary History 
Monthly File, the CRSP Monthly File, and the Compustat North America 
Fundamental Annual File to study the relationship between AFD and ESR. Data 
on stock returns, prices, and shares outstanding are from the CRSP Monthly File. 
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The accounting data needed to calculate book-to-market ratio are from the 
Compustat Annual File. The book value of equity is calculated by summing up 
total common equity, if available, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit. If total common equity is not available, the book value is 
defined as shareholder's equity minus the value of preferred stock. For preferred 
stock, we use redemption value or liquidating value, upon availability. The 
book-to-market ratio is defined as the ratio of the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity. The latter is calculated as the product of the month-end 
share price and the number of shares outstanding. 
4. Examination of AFE 
4.1 Definition of AFE and MAAFE 
The shorter the duration between the estimate issuance date and the forecast 
end date, the more accurate the estimate should be. In order to measure the 
average quality of an estimate, we first introduce the monthly average analyst 
forecast error (MAAFE), which is AFE scaled by the number of months between 
estimate date and forecast end date. The AFE and MAAFE are defined as 
follows: 
八 IT -丨 EsHmatedEPS — ActualEPS | 
I ActualEPS] ‘ 
MAAFE NOM 
where NOM is the number of months between the estimate date and the forecast 
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end date, rounded to the nearest integer. 
Secondly, we endeavor to examine analyst forecast quality in different time 
periods by comparing MAAFE of the forecasts issued before the crashes, during 
the crashes, and in the long window that covers the crashes. 
4.2 Examination of MAAFE 
For the two crashes periods identified in Chapter 2，Table III reports the 
summary statistics of MAAFE of the forecasts issued three months before the 
crashes, during the crashes, and the long window that covers the crashes. For 
1987's stock market crash, we choose approximately symmetric long window 
that covers the stock market crash, which is from August 1986 to the end of 1988. 
The duration is 29 months. For 2000-2002's TBB, the long window covers the 
period from the beginning of 1999 to the end of 2003. The duration is 60 months. 
If analysts tend to provide herding estimates and are reluctant to release negative 
information before crashes, we should expect the AFE three months before 
crashes to be relatively larger. 
[Insert Table III here] 
It is overtly observed from Table III that the mean and median values of the 
MAAFE of the forecasts issued three months before crashes are very close to 
those in the long window, while the variances are slightly smaller. These results 
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indicate that analysts' forecasts issued before crashes are as least as good, if not 
better, than those in the long window. Nevertheless, analysts' forecasts issued 
during the crash are considerably worse, as reflected by large values of mean, 
median, and variance of the MAAFE. Another important observation is that we 
have extremely large value for the maximum MAAFE for both of the crashes 
periods, and the means are significantly larger than the corresponding medians. 
This can be explained by the definition of AFE. When the reported actual EPS of 
the company is close to zero, the AFE and MAAFE can be abnormally high. 
Finally, both the mean value and the variance of the MAAFE for the 2000-2002's 
TBB evidence significant improvement over those of 1987. This observation is 
consistent with our expectation that modem analysts have the access to 
technologies and advanced tools to enhance the quality of their forecasts. 
However, using MAAFE as a measure of the average quality of an estimate 
might be problematic, since the forecast errors may be time-driven and may not 
be linearly associated across months. For example, to calculate the forecast error, 
an estimate issued just before the crash is subtracted from the actual value 
disclosed in the fiscal year-end, at which the crash may have been over and the 
price has rebounded for a number of months. If these forecast errors are used to 
calculate the MAAFE, the result will be biased downward. 
4.3 Examination of AFE by Grouping Duration 
One of the remedies for the aforementioned problem is to group the 
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"duration between the estimate date and the forecast end date", and calculate the 
average AFE"^  within each group to see if the AFE of the forecasts issued before 
the crashes is sufficiently small compared to AFEs of the forecasts issued in other 
time periods. 
Table IV and Table V report the means and standard deviations of the 
average AFE, for the 1987，s stock market crash and 2000-2002's TBB， 
respectively. The average AFEs are calculated by grouping the duration between 
the estimate date and the forecast end date. Comparing the average APE before 
the crash to those in the long window and during-crash period will generate 
useful implication on the analyst forecast ability before stock market crashes. 
[Insert Table IV and Table V here] 
The first finding is that for both crashes, analysts seem to successfully issue 
high quality earning forecasts three months before the crash, especially when the 
estimate date is close to the forecast end date (0-4 month-distance groups), as 
well as when the estimate date is more than 8 months prior to the forecast end 
date (8-12 month- distance groups). However, analysts' ability to issue accurate 
forecasts deteriorates during the crash, which is evidenced especially in the 
2000-2002's TBB (for all distance groups), and in the short distance groups for 
the 1987，s stock market crash (0-4 month-distance groups). 
4 We do not scale this AFE by the number of months between the estimate date and the forecast 
end date. Instead, we group these AFEs by the duration between the estimate date and the 
forecast end date. 
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Secondly, in order to investigate analysts' forecast quality before the 1987，s 
stock market crash, we should focus on estimates made three months before the 
crash, with the duration between estimate date and forecast end date being 5 to 7 
months. This is because the negative effects of the 1987's stock market crash will 
be reflected mostly in the actual earnings released at the year-end of 1987, and 
the early months in 1988. From Table IV we find clear evidence that analysts' 
performance before the crash is significantly inferior to that in the long window 
that covers the crash. For 5-7 month-distance groups, both the mean values and 
the standard deviations of the AFE of the forecasts issued three months before 
the crash are considerably higher than those in the long window and during the 
crash. This methodology is not applicable for the 2000-2002's TBB given the 
crash lasts for two and half years, so that the negative effects of the crash will be 
reflected throughout the years until Sept 2002. Similar to what we find 
previously, the comparison of Table IV and Table V indicates that modem 
analysts are far more "capable" than their predecessors to provide accurate 
forecasts. 
Thirdly, most of the smallest AFEs and variances come in pairs, which 
possibly indicates that when analysts are able to issue accurate forecasts 
compared to the other two groups, they tend to agree with each other. 
Finally, it is consistent with our expectation that the longer the duration 
between estimate date and the forecast end date, the less accurate the forecasts 
are. Similarly, the variance of the AFE increases with the duration, on the 
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average. 
In the last part of this chapter, we reproduce results in Table IV and Table V， 
using primary estimates only. Diluted EPS estimates from companies that 
experienced stock splits between the estimate date and the actual EPS report date 
are excluded. As a result, 20.40% of the observations are deleted in 1987，s 
sub-sample and 99.56% of the observations are deleted in 2000-2002's 
sub-sample^. The results are reported in Table VI. 
[Insert Table VI here] 
The key finding from Table VI, again, is that analyst performance three 
months before crashes is significantly poor at distance group 5，6, and 7，justified 
by a sudden increase in the mean values and the variances. Following the prior 
discussion, this is a rather strong indication that analysts fail to provide accurate 
forecasts before 1987's stock market crash. The dispersions of the forecast errors 
at distance group 5，6，and 7 also widen tremendously, reflecting either there is 
much disagreement among financial analysts in the market, or there is a large 
portion of surprising actual EPSs released at the fiscal year-end. 
5. Examination of AFD 
The abnormal pattern of the mean value and standard deviation of AFE 
5 Since more than 99% of the observations are deleted, we do not investigate 2000-2002's case 
here. 
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before crashes inspires us to take a closer look at the dispersion in analysts' 
opinions in this sensitive period. While AFE is an ex post estimator for the stock 
market crash, AFD is an ex ante indicator (Buchenroth and Jennings (1987)) that 
can be used to provide signals before the market disturbance takes place. It is 
well documented in the literature that AFD tends to be lower when the market 
rises and higher following bad news (Ciccone (2003)). This is because in a 
highly uncertain circumstance, analysts with negative views are penalized less if 
they choose to keep quiet (Jackson (2005)). Under the above arguments, we 
should expect AFD to be considerably lower in the pre-crash period and higher 
when the crash begins. If this hypothesis is true, the extremely high AFE three 
months before the crashes and their variances reported in the last chapter should 
come mainly from the actual earning figures released afterwards, rather than high 
dispersion in analysts' forecasts. Figure FV plots value-weighted monthly average 
AFD from Jan 1976 to Dec 2007，using the whole sample available from the 
I/B/E/S Summary History Monthly File. We follow the widely accepted 
definition of AFD in the extant literature and define AFD as the standard 
deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings 
forecast. However, it should be noted that the average AFDs calculated each 
month are value-weighted under two considerations. First, we believe that AFDs 
for companies with different market-capitalizations should have different impacts 
in the market, thus should be given different weightings. Secondly, unlike AFE 
variable that is calculated from the I/B/E/S Detail History File, AFD is derived 
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from the I/B/E/S Summary History File. As noted by Diether et al. (2002)，the 
sample contained in the Summary File is heavily tilted to the big stocks. This 
indicates that the equal-weighted average dispersion will reflect the average 
dispersion for only one segment of the whole market. Using value-weighted AFD 
attenuates this problem to some extent. 
[Insert Figure IV here] 
The first finding from Figure IV is rather evident - the monthly average 
AFDs at year ends are considerably lower than they are in the middle months 
every year. The average dispersion is 0.084 for all Novembers, Decembers, 
Januaries and Februaries in our sample, but it is 0.094 for all Mays, Junes and 
Julys and Augusts. Furthermore, the AFD plot exhibits a cycle-pattern. 13 out of 
32 (41%) AFD annual peaks occur in the middle months from May to August, 
and 25 out of 32 (78%) AFD annual troughs come from the year-end months 
from November to February. It seems reasonable that analysts find it easier to 
reach consensus based on information disclosed in the final report than that in the 
interim report, given duration between estimate issuance date and forecast end 
date is shorter for most estimates issued at year-end months. 
More importantly, we do not observe abnormal patterns of AFD before the 
two crashes from Figure FV. The biggest swings occur at 1982-1984, the end of 
1989，1992-1994，and 1999. Most of these time slots belong to certain bullish 
2 0 
trends in the market. During the most serious stock market crashes in 1987 and 
2000-2002, the AFD plot behaves rather quietly. To provide a detailed story 
about the AFD performance in these two episodes, we move on to extract two 
sub-samples that cover the two crashes and plot the monthly average AFDs in 
Figure V and Figure VI，respectively. 
[Insert Figure V and Figure VI here] 
The above two plots partly support our previous hypothesis. For the 1987，s 
plot, we observe lower AFDs three months before the market crash. However, 
when the crash begins, the AFD stays constant for a month and then continuously 
falls. This finding is opposite to our expectation partly because the 1987，s crash 
is rather acute and evident, which allows analysts to reach a consensus that the 
crash will continue. After November when the crash ended, AFD rebounded 20% 
in December, reflecting analysts' different concerns on whether the crash has 
come to the end. 
The performance of AFD before and during 2000-2002，s TBB tells a 
different story. Except for the Nasdaq index which consists of a large proportion 
of technology stocks and hence experiences several dramatic slumps, the other 
two indices behave more like a bear market than an acute market crash during the 
TBB. This partially explains why the AFD fluctuates at a relatively high level 
throughout this period. Moreover, the AFD plot exhibits a downward trend in the 
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first few months of the TBB，after which it rebounds dramatically and never 
returns until the end of TBB. It seems that the disagreement among analysts 
closely track the uncertainty of the index performance, which makes it more 
difficult for analysts to determine the ending point of the TBB compared with the 
case in 1987's stock market crash. 
In summary, the AFD plots in Figure IV, V, and VI give no strong signals 
before the two crashes anyhow. A tentative conclusion is that the abnormally 
high AFE and its standard deviation documented in Chapter 3 are mainly caused 
by surprising reported earning figures, rather than dispersion in analysts' 
opinions before the crashes. However, the above argument sheds light on future 
studies to seek for clearer patterns in the evolution of AFD in different industries. 
The further examination of analysts forecast quality during the stock market 
crash is motivated by a rich literature on the relationship between AFD and 
abnormal stock returns. Initiated by Miller (1977), and supported by Diether et al. 
(2002)，AFD is proved to have a strong negative correlation with excess stock 
returns. In the following chapter, we will test this relationship on two 
sub-samples of the IBES Summary History Files, which cover the 1987，s crash 
and 2000-2002's TBB. 
6. Examination of the Relationship between AFD and ESR 
In this chapter, we incorporate AFD into the traditional Fama-French 
three-factor models, and test the relationship between AFD and ESR on a 
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sub-sample of the dataset that covers 2000-2002's TBB^ Following Diether et al. 
(2002)'s portfolio strategies, we sort the stocks into portfolios according to 
different characteristics, such as size, book-to-market ratio, and dispersion in 
analysts' forecasts. If AFD explains a significant portion of ESR after we control 
other factors used in the traditional Fama-French model, it is possible that AFD 
can be used as another important risk proxy to be included to explain ESR during 
stock market crashes. 
6.1 Portfolio Strategy - Sorting by Size and Dispersion 
For each month in our sub-samples, we first sort the stocks into five 
dispersion quintiles. For each dispersion quintile, we calculate the monthly 
portfolio return as the value-weighted average of the returns of all the stocks in 
the portfolio. The last column of Table VII shows that this sorting produces a 
positive relationship between average returns and dispersion in analysts' earnings 
forecasts. The annual return on the D5 - D1 strategy is 20.95 percent, and is 
marginally significant. 
[Insert Table VII here] 
Table VII also presents two-way cuts on size and dispersion to test if we are 
simply capturing a size effect. Each month, we assign stocks to one of five 
6 1987’s sub-sample covers only 29 months and is not long enough to carry out time series 
analysis. 
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quintiles based on the level of market capitalization as of the third Thursday of 
the previous month. We further sort stocks in each size quintile into five smaller 
quintiles based on dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts as of the previous 
month. Although it is clear from Table VII that all the D1-D5 strategies for 
different size quintiles produce negative monthly average returns, the patterns of 
the returns across dispersion quintiles are different for firms with different sizes. 
For large firms, average returns rise with dispersion; while for small firms, the 
returns decrease first and increase afterwards with dispersion. The results for 
small firms are less reliable due to the fact that they are generally covered with 
less analysts. As a result, some dispersion quintiles contain only a small number 
of firms. 
Another interesting finding from the upper panel of Table VII is that within 
nearly each dispersion quintile, average return increases with firm size until the 
fourth size quintile, and then suddenly drops for the largest size quintile. If the 
relationship between average returns and dispersion is positive, then the above 
finding can be partly explained by the lower panel of Table VII，in which we 
observe significantly lower mean dispersion values for the largest stocks, except 
for the lowest dispersion quintile. The rationale behind this finding is quite 
straightforward. Large stocks are followed by the most analysts, which creates a 
breeding ground for the most herding forecasts, thereby reducing the stocks' 
future return. 
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Other findings are consistent with those of Diether et al. (2002). Return 
differential between low and high dispersion portfolios declines as the average 
size increases, and the mean dispersion declines as the average size increases. 
If we follow Diether et al. (2002) to reproduce our results using 
equal-weighted average returns?，the sorting provides highly significant and 
negative return differentials for all D1-D5 Strategies except for the smallest 
portfolio, as reported in Table VIII. The whole-sample annual return on the D5 -
D1 strategy is 12.64 percent, and is highly significant. Since we are using the 
same methodology, same procedure to produce the results in Table VIII as 
Diether et al. (2002) are, it is worth to note that the sample selection is the only 
reason that our results are opposite to those documented in the literature. 
[Insert Table VIII here] 
Table DC reports the sorting results for 1987，s sub-sample, using 
equal-weighted average returns. We find a positive relationship between average 
returns and dispersion in analysts' forecasts as we do over 2000-2002，s 
sub-sample. The patterns of the mean returns across different dispersion quintiles 
are similar to what we find earlier in Table VII and Table VIII，except that only 
return differentials for large size portfolios are statistically significant. The 
whole-sample annual return on the D5 - D1 strategy is 6.18 percent, and is 
7 From here on to the end of Section 6.2, we produce our results based on equal-weighted returns 
only, since it is hard to interpret the significance of the t-statistics for the return differentials if 
value-weighted returns are used. 
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highly significant. 
[Insert Table IX here] 
To summarize, the results show that we are not simply picking up a size 
effect, since the two way sorts still produce a strong relationship between 
average returns and dispersion for almost all the quintiles. More importantly, we 
arrive at an opposite conclusion from the existing literature that the AFDs are 
negatively correlated with the mean stock returns. On the contrary, we find the 
relationship to be positive, at least for the two periods that cover the most serious 
stock market crashes after the I/B/E/S dataset is available. In the next part of this 
chapter, we further sort our portfolios by book to market ratio (BMR) to test if 
the return differentials still remain significant across different dispersion 
quintiles. 
6.2 Portfolio Strategy - Sorting by Size and Book to Market Ratio (BMR) 
To test whether the return differentials across different dispersion quintiles 
are simply caused by the value of BMRs, we sort the dataset into 27 categories 
on size, BMR, and dispersion (in that order). We first sort the whole dataset into 
three size portfolios based on the market capitalization at the end of the previous 
month. Within each size portfolio, stocks are assigned into three BMR portfolios: 
low, medium, and high BMRs. BMR is calculated as annually updated book 
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value of the stock divided by the monthly updated market value of the stock, so 
that BMR is updated each month. For each calendar year T and month t, we use 
book equity in calendar year T-1 and market capitalization in month t-1 to ensure 
that all the accounting information are known before the monthly returns are 
calculated. Finally, we sort each BMR portfolio into three dispersion portfolios. 
Table X reports the mean return figures and the mean dispersion values of the 27 
portfolios for the sub-sample that covers the TBB. Table XI displays the same 
statistics for the sub-sample that covers 1987's stock market crash. 
[Insert Table X and Table XI here] 
As suggested by the results reported in Table X and Table XI, after 
controlling the size and BMR factors, most of the return differentials across 
different dispersion quintiles remain highly significant. Therefore, the return 
differentials may not merely capture the BMR effect. More importantly, the 
positive relationship between AFD and mean stock return remains clear, 
suggesting the possibility of using AFD as a risk proxy to explain ESR. Further, 
in the lower panels of both Table X and Table XI，we find that value (high BMR) 
stocks have larger average dispersion in forecasts than growth (low BMR) stocks, 
implying that BMRs are positively related to dispersion in analysts' forecasts. 
Another interesting finding is that for each size group, value stocks earn 
considerably lower returns than growth stocks, which holds true for every 
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dispersion group. This finding is not consistent with our expectation. Since 
BMRs are positively related to dispersion, and if we assume that dispersion 
proxies for risk, the value premium should be positive. The dilemma casts doubt 
on the use of BMR as a risk proxy to explain EMR in the Fama-French 
three-factor model. 
6.3 Fama-French Time Series Regression Test (Three-Factor Model) 
Fama and French (1996) argue that the three-factor time series model in 
Fama and French (1993) can capture the ordering of stock returns across deciles 
sorted by variables such as size, BMR, or earning to price ratio. In this section, 
we introduce a new variable, known as AFD, into the traditional Fama-French 
three factor model to study its impact on stock returns during stock market 
crashes. We first sort stocks in the 2000-2002's sub-sample into five dispersion 
quintiles, and obtain their value-weighted and equal-weighted average returns. 
The corresponding ESRs on the left hand side of the model are derived by 
subtracting risk-free rate from the returns obtained^ On the right hand side of the 
model, the three factors are constructed in the way suggested by Fama and 
French (1993). The first factor is Rm-Rf, which is the excess return on the market 
portfolio. The second factor is SMB, which is the difference between the return 
on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks. The 
third factor is HML, which is the difference between the return on a portfolio 
8 We use monthly average rate of one month U.S. treasury bill as the risk-free rate. 
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comprised of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio comprised 
of low book-to-market stocks. The reported t-statistics are Newey-adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. We follow the simplified Goldilocks 
method to choose lag length 3 for the calculation of Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation - Consistent (HAC) standard errors^. 
In contrast to Diether et al. (2002)'s regression results which are based on a 
whole sample from 1983 to 2000, the estimated intercepts reported in both Table 
XII and Table XIII indicate that the three-factor model leaves a significant 
positive unexplained return for the portfolio of stocks in the lowest dispersion 
quintile. This implies that the three-factor model fails to capture explanatory 
power when the market rises and analysts agree with one another. Moreover, it is 
worth to note that for high dispersion quintiles, the loadings on HML become 
negative or even significantly negative if we use equal-weighted average returns. 
This finding is consistent with the previous discussion that for high dispersion 
stocks, the value premiums become negative if we control for the size of the 
companies. Other findings are similar to Diether et al. (2002)，s. Low-dispersion 
stocks behave like big, value stocks, as they have less loading on SMB but heavy 
loading on HML. High-dispersion stocks behave like small, growth stocks 
accordingly. 
[Insert Table XII and Table XIII here] 
9 We use simplified Goldilocks method to determine the lag length for Newey-West estimation -
m = 0.75T"3，where m is the lag length, T is the number of observations in the sample. 
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To decide whether dispersion of analysts' forecasts can serve as a risk proxy 
to explain ESRs, we further add average dispersion of the monthly portfolios to 
the right hand side of Fama-French three-factor models to test the significance 
status of the loading on AFD. 
6.4 Fama-French Time Series Regression Test (Three-Factor Model with 
Dispersion on the Right Hand Side) 
Table XIV and Table XV report the time series regression results of 
Fama-French three factor model with dispersion included in the factor list, using 
value-weighted returns and equal-weighted returns, respectively. First, the 
insignificant Newey-adjusted t statistics for dispersion do not support the 
hypothesis that dispersion can serve as a significant explanatory variable in the 
models, even after we remove insignificant HML factor in both of the regressions. 
Secondly, except for the excess market return and SMB factor, we detect 
different signs for the other factor loadings when we use different method to 
calculate average returns. For example, if we use equal-weighted returns, the 
positive sign of the loading on dispersion is consistent with what we find 
previously, and the factor loading on HML and unexplained variation of ESRs 
are negative and insignificant. However, if we use value-weighted returns, the 
sign of the loading on dispersion becomes negative, which is consistent with 
those documented in the literature. Moreover, the factor loadings on HML and 
unexplained variation of ESRs become positive and insignificant. The reported 
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R-square values are high but normal for time series regressions. 
[Insert Table XIV and Table XV] 
After controlling factors such as market risk, size, and book-to-market ratio, 
the insignificant loading on AFD presented above denies the use of AFD as a risk 
proxy to explain variation in stock returns, and the positive relationship between 
AFD and ESR emerged from previous sorting exercises remains unexplained. 
However, it looks reasonable that in a highly uncertain environment, it is hard to 
find a clear and linear relationship between two variables that are also highly 
unstable. 
6.5 Introduction of a Nonlinear Form of AFD to the Fama-French Model 
In suspect that nonlinear forms of dispersion may possess more explanatory 
power than linear forms do, we further add a squared term of dispersion to the 
right hand side of the three-factor model. The estimation results are displayed in 
Table XVI. On one hand for the equal-weighted regression, the introduction of 
the squared dispersion changes both the significance status and the sign of the 
factor loading on dispersion. However, the regression leaves a large positive 
portion of unexplained variation in ESR, indicating the introduction of the 
squared dispersion shrinks the joint explanatory power of all the factors. On the 
other hand, for the value-weighted regression, the introduction of the squared 
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dispersion does not seem to change the overall pattern of the factor loadings 
displayed in Table XV largely, except for the sign of the loading on dispersion. 
[Insert Table XVI here] 
To conclude this section, the positive relationship between AFD and stock 
returns derived from the previous sorting exercises cannot be explained by the 
Fama-French three-factor model. Additionally, our results are sensitive to the 
ways we calculate average stock returns. Finally, the attempt to replace AFD with 
a non-linear form does not seem to be appropriate, since the explanatory power 
of the model decreases dramatically. If we consider AFD as an ex ante parameter, 
using lagged AFD or even non-linear forms of the lagged AFD to explain ESR 
might be a good choice. We leave the search for appropriate forms of AFD in the 
asset pricing model to future studies. 
7. Conclusions 
In this thesis, we empirically investigate the quality of analysts' forecasts 
issued before and during stock market crashes in the U.S. from 1985 to 2007. We 
provide evidence that analysts' forecasts issued before crashes are not superior, if 
not worse, compared to those issued in the long window, and they are even worse 
during the market disturbance. The surge of the magnitude and the variance of 
AFE three months before the crashes does not serve as an ex ante indicator to 
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foretell the crashes, but raise our interest to scrutinize AFD behavior in the 
crashes periods. Our results suggest that disagreement among analysts before and 
during crashes do not differ much from that in the long window, implying that 
the source of the increase of AFE is mainly related to surprising earning figures 
released at fiscal year-ends. 
Further, we document a positive relationship between AFD and ESR for 
large stocks and high BMR stocks in the period that covers 2000-2002's TBB. 
This is not surprising, given that it makes much more sense to use AFD as a risk 
proxy during bad times. The more analysts disagree about the ending time of a 
stock market crash, the more likely the market will experience dramatic 
fluctuation, and the higher investors need to be compensated. Under this 
argument, there is a high possibility that AFD can proxy for risk at any sensitive 
periods. However, by incorporating dispersion into the Fama-French three-factor 
model, our results from the time series regression demonstrate that dispersion 
only explains an insignificant portion of the variation in stock returns. Although 
the loading on dispersion is manipulated to be significant after we introduce a 
nonlinear term of dispersion into the equal-weighted regression model, it reduces 
the joint explanatory power of all the factors. 
In conclusion, our examination of analysts' behavior around stock market 
crashes in the U.S. shows that the pattern of analysts' forecasts issued before 
stock market crashes provides no identifiable warning signals for the coming 
market turbulence. Analysts tend to herd opinions as they do so in the long 
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window. In the final analysis, the newly discovered positive relationship between 
AFD and ESR makes it possible to use AFD as a risk proxy to explain ESR 
during sensitive periods, but appropriate forms of dispersion to be included in the 
asset-pricing model remain undetermined. 
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Summary and Comparison of Three Major U.S. Stock Indices 
Available Covered Characters of companies Covered Methodology 
since companies countries 
DJIA 1896 30 Largest and most widely held public U.S. Price-weighted, scaled if 
companies. there were stock splits. 
N a s i 0 0 Jan 1985 100 Largest domestic and international all Modified value-weighted. 
non-financial companies. 
SP500 1957 500 Large publicly held companies. Mostly U.S. Market value-weighted. 
4 0 
Table II. 
Identification of stock market crashes from 1985 to 2007 
The benchmark for stock market crashes is set to be 30% declination for all three indices. The 
starting and ending dates for the crashes are determined by Criterion B, which states that at least 
two of the indices reach a two-year peak (or trough), and fall (or rise) more than 15% in the 
following 2 months. 
DJ Nasdaq SP500 
Starting Ending Starting Ending Starting Ending 
1987 crash 1987.8.17 1987.11.30 1987.8.17 1987.11.30 1987.8.17 1987.11.30 
Index 2709.5 1766.74 421.15 260.87 335.9 223.92 
Peak/Trough Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
% Fall(-)/Rise in 2 months -28.00 1 0 ^ -30.95 -26.11 15.80 
Duration 3.5 month 3.5months 3.5 months 
% Index change in total -34.79 -38.06 -33.33 
00-02 TBB 2000.3.20 2002.9.30 2000.3.20 2002.9.30 2000.3.20 2002.9.30 
Index 11112.72 7528.4 4691.61 815.4 1527.46 800.58 
Peak/Trough No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% Fall(-)/Rise in 2 months -7.32 -33.89 -19.70 17.00 
Duration 2.5 years 2.5 years 2.5 years 
% Index change in total -32.25 -82.62 -47.59 
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Table III. 
Summary Statistics ofMAAFE 
Analyst Forecast error is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the estimates 
EPS and the actual EPS, scaled by the absolute value of the actual EPS. Monthly Average Analyst 
Forecast Error (MAAFE) is defined as AFE scaled by the number of months between the estimate 
date and the forecast end date. 
Year Duration No. of Mean Variance Quartile MAAFE 
observations min 25% 50% 75% max 
1987 Long window 207261 0.241 4.17 0 0.009 0.030 0.114 393.93 
crash 3 months before 22196 0.241 2.98 0 0.009 0.028 0.105 64.80 
During the crash 25177 0.350 9.99 0 0.012 0.039 0.146 170.75 
2000- Long window 542014 0.095 0.23 0 0.007 0.021 0.060 127.71 
2002 3 months before 20963 0.098 0.18 0 0.007 0.021 0.054 25.16 
crash During the crash 270984 0.106 0.26 0 0.008 0.023 0.068 127.71 
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Table IV. 
Summary Statistics of the Average AFE by Grouping the Duration between 
the Estimate Date and the Forecast End Date (From 1986.8 to 1988.12) 
The average AFEs are derived from grouping the duration between the estimate date and the 
forecast end date. For example, for the "Distance 1,3 m Before" group, we include all estimates 
issued in month 1, 2, and 3 before the crash begins, and their forecast end dates should be in 
month 2, 3, and 4，respectively. The average AFE is then calculated as the simple average of all 
these qualified estimates for this group. 
Distance Statistics Long Window 3 m Before During the Crash 
0 Mean (%) 0.685 0.372 0.676 
Std. Dev. 5.737 0.838 2.406 
1 Mean (%) 0.593 0.601 0.799 
Std. Dev. 3.662 3.076 5.600 
2 Mean (%) 0.530 0.578 0.782 
Std. Dev. 3.759 1.923 7.187 
3 Mean (%) 0.777 0.761 0.921 
Std. Dev. 5.462 2.022 8.560 
4 Mean (%) 0.777 0.910 0.903 
Std. Dev. 4.600 2.035 5.589 
5 Mean (%) 0.803 1.101 0.708 
Std. Dev. 5.208 7.862 2.118 
6 Mean (%) 1.185 1.642 0.837 
Std. Dev. 7.918 11.123 2.390 
7 Mean (%) 1.191 1.859 0.796 
Std. Dev. 9.578 16.047 2.134 
8 Mean (%) 1.158 0.940 0.942 
Std. Dev. 9.061 2.873 3.342 
9 Mean (%) 1.169 1.035 0.964 
Std. Dev. 7.692 2.336 2.357 
10 Mean (%) 1.144 0.786 0.745 
Std. Dev. 8.101 1.457 2.261 
11 Mean (%) 1.197 0.594 1.428 
Std. Dev. 9.642 1.517 5.563 
12 Mean (%) 1.284 0.990 1.066 
Std. Dev. 7.740 2.439 4.560 
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Table V. 
Summary Statistics of the Average AFE by Grouping the Duration between 
the Estimate Date and the Forecast End Date (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The average AFEs are derived from grouping the duration between the estimate date and the 
forecast end date. For example, for the "Distance 1,3 m Before" group, we include all estimates 
issued in month 1,2，and 3 before the crash begins, and their forecast end dates should be in 
month 2, 3，and 4，respectively. The average AFE is then calculated as the simple average of all 
these qualified estimates for this group. 
Distance Statistics Long Window 3 m Before During the Crash 
0 Mean (%) 0.189 O O T 0.176 
Std. Dev. 0.875 1.028 0.739 
1 Mean (%) 0.214 0.154 0.220 
Std. Dev. 1.341 0.435 1.489 
2 Mean (%) 0.203 0.211 0.214 
Std. Dev. 0.949 0.538 0.936 
3 Mean (%) 0.280 0.223 0.317 
Std. Dev. 1.123 0.428 1.131 
4 Mean (%) 0.386 0.292 0.446 
Std. Dev. 2.323 0.889 2.989 
5 Mean (%) 0.391 0.345 0.438 
Std. Dev. 1.625 1.246 1.770 
6 Mean (%) 0.552 0.701 0.626 
Std. Dev. 2.184 2.867 2.345 
7 Mean (%) 0.644 1.137 0.769 
Std. Dev. 2.435 4.025 2.945 
8 Mean (%) 0.624 0.904 0.710 
Std. Dev. 2.394 3.360 2.636 
9 Mean (%) 0.758 0.655 0.918 
Std. Dev. 2.924 2.542 3.482 
10 Mean (%) 0.894 0.776 1.149 
Std. Dev. 3.000 3.011 3.715 
11 Mean (%) 0.818 0.838 1.056 
Std. Dev. 3.365 3.849 4.244 
12 Mean (%) 0.716 0.289 0.889 
Std. Dev. 3.224 0.896 1.729 
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Table VI. 
Summary Statistics of the Average AFE by Grouping the Duration between 
the Estimate Date and the Forecast End Date and Using Primary Estimates 
Only (From 1986.8 to 1988.12) 
The average AFEs are derived from grouping the duration between the estimate date and the 
forecast end date. For example, for the “Distance 1,3 m Before” group, we include all estimates 
issued in month 1 ,2 , and 3 before the crash begins, and their forecast end dates should be in 
month 2，3, and 4，respectively. The average AFE is then calculated as the simple average of all 
these qualified estimates for this group. 
Distance Statistics Long window 3 m before During the crash 
0 Mean (%) 0349 ^ 
Std. Dev. 6.840 0.768 2.791 
1 Mean (%) 0.749 0.956 1.152 
Std. Dev. 5.464 5.014 9.020 
2 Mean (%) 0.754 0.765 1.065 
Std. Dev. 6.036 3.640 9.055 
3 Mean (%) 1.096 1.160 1.573 
Std. Dev. 8.038 5.629 12.600 
4 Mean (%) 1.143 0.902 1.496 
Std. Dev. 7.490 2.185 10.038 
5 Mean (%) 1.202 1.981 0.768 
Std. Dev. 9.200 15.02 2.225 
6 Mean (%) 1.980 3.096 0.830 
Std. Dev. 15.850 2.977 2.190 
7 Mean (%) 1.878 3.228 0.889 
Std. Dev. 16.366 27.467 2.693 
8 Mean (%) 1.753 0.975 1.007 
Std. Dev. 14.547 2.859 3.709 
9 Mean (%) 1.842 1.116 1.026 
Std. Dev. 17.565 2.470 2.866 
10 Mean (%) 2.085 0.776 0.887 
Std. Dev. 18.994 1.201 2.822 
11 Mean (%) 2.132 0.699 1.531 
Std. Dev. 17.459 2.325 5.559 
12 Mean (%) 1.695 1.040 1.138 
Std. Dev. 13.417 2.589 5.197 
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Table VIII. 
Mean Portfolio Returns by Size and Dispersion in Analysts' Forecasts Using 
Equal-Weighted Returns (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The reported mean returns are value-weighted returns in percentage form. The t-statistics 
reported here base on monthly value-weighted average returns, rather than the whole-sample 
equal-weighted average returns, thus should be less informative on the significance of the return 
differential of the dispersion portfolios. The t-statistics are Newey-adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlations. 
Mean Returns 
Size quintiles 
Dispersion Small Large All 
Quintiles ^ ^ ^ ^ S5 Stocks 
Dl(low) MO ^ ^ 1.05 
D2 1.12 1.62 1.52 1.70 1.29 1.63 
D3 0.83 1.16 2.19 2.13 1.78 1.93 
D4 1.62 2.06 2.25 2.81 1.69 2.33 
D5(high) 1.80 3.03 2.88 3.63 2.71 2.99 
D1-D5 -0.40 -1.42 -0.67 -1.22 -1.64 -1.94 
t-statistic (-0.28) (-0.95) (-0.49) ( -0 .89 ) (-1.33) (-1.46) 
Mean Dispersion 
Dispersion Size Quintiles All 
Quintiles ^ ^ ^ ^ S5 Stocks 
Dl(low) 0.006 0.006 0,006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
D2 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.013 0.017 
D3 0.053 0.041 0.037 0.029 0.023 0.033 
D4 0.124 0.094 0.078 0.059 0.046 0.074 
D5(high) 1.163 0.713 0.624 0.477 0.250 0.475 
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Table VIII. 
Mean Portfolio Returns by Size and Dispersion in Analysts' Forecasts Using 
Equal-Weighted Returns (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The reported mean returns are equal-weighted returns in percentage form. The t-statistics are 
Newey-adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
Mean Returns 
Size quintiles 
Dispersion Small Large All 
Quintiles ^ ^ ^ ^ S5 Stocks 
Dl(low) L25 1^1 ^ ^ 3 3 LSI m ~ 
D2 0.94 1.59 1.53 1.72 1.39 1.54 
D3 0.81 1.20 2.14 2.08 1.87 1.72 
D4 1.43 1.99 2.21 2.84 2.12 2.02 
D5(high) 1.61 3.08 2.95 3.72 3.12 2.84 
D1-D5 -0.36 -1.47 -0.77 -1.39 -1.61 -1.12 
t-statistic (-1.27) (-3.95) (-2.40) (-4.02) (-5.04) (-7.28) 
Mean Dispersion 
Dispersion Size Quintiles All 
Quintiles ^ ^ ^ ^ S5 Stocks 
Dl(low) O ^ 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
D2 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.018 
D3 0.053 0.041 0.037 0.029 0.023 0.036 
D4 0.124 0.094 0.079 0.060 0.046 0.081 
D5(high) 1.190 0.728 0.613 0.473 0.317 0.664 
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Table VIII. 
Mean Portfolio Returns by Size and Dispersion in Analysts' Forecasts Using 
Equal-Weighted Returns (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The reported mean returns are equal-weighted returns in percentage form. The t-statistics are 
Newey-adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
Mean Returns 
Size quintiles 
Dispersion Small Large All 
Quintiles ^ ^ ^ ^ S5 Stocks 
Dl(low) ^ L?7 r ^ r ^ U O r o 6 ~ 
D2 0.47 0.87 1.61 1,03 1.06 1.09 
D3 0.30 0.84 1.64 1.33 1.15 1.21 
D4 -0.03 1.22 1.99 1.74 1.61 1.28 
D5(high) 1.08 1.55 1.98 2.17 2.47 1.59 
D1-D5 -0.64 -0.18 -0.95 -1.08 -1.37 -0.53 
t-statistic' (-1.31) (-0.33) (-1.87) (-2.45) ( - 3 .83 ) (-2.49) 
Mean Dispersion 
Dispersion Size Quintiles All 
Quintiles ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Stocks 
Dl(low) 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.015 
D2 0.049 0.043 0.037 0.034 0.031 0.036 
D3 0.098 0.079 0.065 0.055 0.047 0.063 
D4 0.203 0.156 0.123 0.100 0.076 0.122 
D5(high) 1.164 L ^ 0.397 0.867 
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Table VIII. 
Mean Portfolio Returns by Size and Dispersion in Analysts' Forecasts Using 
Equal-Weighted Returns (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The reported mean returns are equal-weighted returns in percentage form. The t-statistics are 
Newey-adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
Mean Returns 
Small Size Medium Size Large Size 
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Dispersion B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M 
Low Z75 LOS ^ L39 ^ \ 3 1 0.39 
Medium 2.57 0.88 -0.31 4.02 1.31 0.19 3.53 1.65 0.39 
High 4.42 2.00 0.65 5.51 2.67 0.81 5.45 2.99 1.17 
Low-High -1.67 -0.97 -0.19 -2.12 -1.28 -0.61 -2.25 -1.62 -0.78 
t-statistic' -3.67 -2.86 -3.72 -4.84 -4.08 -2.33 -3.07 -5.94 -3.07 
Mean Dispersion 
Small Size Medium Size Large Size 
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Dispersion B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M 
Low 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Medium 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 
High 0.49 0.47 0.92 0.30 0.32 0.53 0.12 0.14 0.30 
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Table VIII. 
Mean Portfolio Returns by Size and Dispersion in Analysts' Forecasts Using 
Equal-Weighted Returns (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The reported mean returns are equal-weighted returns in percentage form. The t-statistics are 
Newey-adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
Mean Returns 
Small Size Medium Size Large Size 
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Dispersion B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M 
Low 1.69 0.13 -0.53 2.21 0.71 0.24 1.60 0.85 0.33 
Medium 1.69 0.27 -1.18 2.84 0.94 0.24 1.67 1.25 0.47 
High 2.94 1.64 0.07 2.99 2.28 1.21 3.38 2.15 1.52 
Low-High -1.25 -1.51 -0.60 -0.78 -1.57 -0.97 -1.78 -1.3 -1.19 
t-statistic -2.00 -2.90 -1.19 -1.27 -3.09 -2.32 -3.98 -3.43 -3.39 
Mean Dispersion 
Small Size Medium Size Large Size 
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Dispersion B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M B/M 
Low 0 . 0 1 5 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 4 6 0 . 0 1 4 0 . 0 2 1 0 . 0 3 4 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 0 2 4 0 . 0 3 0 
Medium 0.065 0.080 0.156 0.050 0.057 0.106 0.036 0.052 0.074 
High 0.487 0.728 1.396 0.419 0.435 1.187 0.151 0.449 0.395 
5 0 
Table XII. 
Time Series Test Results of Fama-French Three-Factor Models Using 
Value-Weighted Returns (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The dependent variable is value-weighted excess stock returns. The t-statistics are 
Newey-adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
Factor Sensitivities 
Portfolio Alpha(%) Rm - Rf SMB HML Adj. R^ 
D1 (low dispersion) 0.8 0.664 0.034 0.015 0.75 
NeweyAdj. t (2.57) (14.50) (5.46) (3.34) 
D2 0.4 0.762 0.046 0.014 0.80 
NeweyAdj. t (1.72) (13.63) (7.57) (3.76) 
D3 0.2 0.964 0.058 0.008 0.85 
NeweyAdj. t (0.84) (14.95) (8.66) (1.70) 
D4 0.03 1.154 0.065 -0.003 0.84 
NeweyAdj. t (0.11) (13.82) (5.99) (-0.25) 
D5(high dispersion) 0.03 1.43 0.078 -0.009 0.86 
NeweyAdj. t (0.69) (13.02) (7.17) (-0.62) 
Tests for ARCH effecst and Serial Correlations 
ARCH effect Serial correlation 
P-value P-value P-value conclusion DW conclusion 
Regression (lagl) (lag2) (lag3) statistic 
D1 0.81 0.28 0.28 No ARCH 1.53 Uncertain 
D2 0.81 0.43 0.21 No ARCH 1.68 Uncertain 
D3 0.68 0.74 0.62 No ARCH 1.95 No SC 
D4 0.46 0.73 0.63 No ARCH 2.06 No SC 
D5 0.63 0.81 0.83 No ARCH 2.06 No SC 
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Table XIII. 
Time Series Test Results of Fama-French Three-Factor Models Using 
Equal-Weighted Returns (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The dependent variable is equal-weighted excess stock returns. The t-statistics are 
Newey-adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
Factor Sensitivities 
Portfolio Alpha(%) Rm - Rf SMB HML Adj. R^ 
D1 (low dispersion) 1 0.722 0.253 0.084 0.73 
NeweyAdj. t (3.50) (12.48) (3.71) (4.32) 
D2 0.6 0.823 0.395 0.046 0.80 
NeweyAdj. t (2.60) (13.12) (7.39) (2.50) 
D3 0.3 1.016 0.537 -0.032 0.85 
NeweyAdj. t (0.97) (12.14) (10.55) (-1.09) 
D4 -0.1 1.182 0.652 -0.144 0.87 
NeweyAdj. t (-0.39) (14.20) (9.20) (-2.83) 
D5(high dispersion) 0.07 1.455 0.833 -0.224 0.90 
NeweyAdj. t (0.16) (15.92) (8.14) (-2.86) 
Tests for ARCH effecst and Serial Correlations 
ARCH effect Serial correlation 
P-value P-value P-value conclusion DW conclusion 
Regression (lagl) (lag2) (lag3) statistic 
D1 0.94 0.31 0.36 No ARCH 1.57 Uncertain 
D2 0.94 0.62 0.70 No ARCH 1.56 Uncertain 
D3 0.60 0.91 1.21 No ARCH 1.77 No SC 
D4 0.49 0.54 0.14 No ARCH 1.92 No SC 
D5 0.44 No ARCH 1.91 No SC 
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Table XIV. 
Time Series Test Results of Fama-French Three-Factor Models with 
Dispersion Using Equal-Weighted Returns (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The dependent variable is equal-weighted excess stock returns. The returns used to calculate 
SMB and HML are also equal weighted. The t-statistics are Newey-adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
Factor Sensitivities 
Dependent Variable: ESRs Alpha(%) R m - R f SMB HML Dispersion Adj. R^ 
Factor Loadings -0.32 1.04 0.53 -0.05 0.04 0.89 
Newey Adj. t (-0.22) (16.90) (10.80) (-1.51) (0.49) 
Factor Loadings -0.56 1.07 0.52 0.07 0.88 
Newey Adj. t (-0.40) (18.27) (10.24) ( 0 ^ 
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Table XV. 
Time Series Test Results of Fama-French Three-Factor Models with 
Dispersion Using Value-Weighted Returns (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The dependent variable is value-weighted excess stock returns. The returns used to calculate 
SMB and HML are also value-weighted. The t-statistics are Newey-adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
Factor Sensitivities 
Dependent Variable: ESRs Alpha(%) Rm - Rf SMB HML Dispersion Adj. R^ 
Factor Loadings 0.99 0.99 0.06 0.005 -0.11 0.89 
NeweyAdj . t (1.1) (17.07) (8.72) (0.91) (-0.73) 
Factor Loadings 0.90 0.98 0.06 -0.10 0.88 
NeweyAdj. t (1.01) (16.69) (8.24) (-0.70) 
5 4 
Table XVI. 
Nonlinear Time Series Test Results of Fama-French Three-Factor Models 
with Dispersion (From 1999.1 to 2004.1) 
The dependent variable is equal-weighted and value-weighted excess stock returns. The method 
used to calculate corresponding SMB and HML is the same. The t-statistics are Newey-adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlations. 
Factor Sensitivities 
Dep. Variable: ESRs Alpha(%) Rm-Rf SMB HML Dispersion Dispersion^ Adj. R^ 
Equal-weighted 10.80 1.04 0.54 -0.06 -1.45 4.77 0.90 
NeweyAdj.t (2.01) (17.43) (10.08) (-2.77) (-2.09) (2.20) 
Value-weighted 0.50 1.00 0.06 0.005 0.04 -1.01 0.87 
NeweyAdj.t (0.24) (16.87) (8.50) (0.92) (0.08) (-0.34) 
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Figure I. 
Three Major U.S. Stock Indices (From 1985 to 1990) 
Adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average is derived by dividing the original index by 3，so that it is 
comparable with the other indices along time. 
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Figure II. 
Three Major U.S. Stock Indices (From 1990 to 2000) 
Adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average is derived by dividing the original index by 3, so that it is 
comparable with the other indices along time. 
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Figure III. 
Three Major U.S. Stock Indices (From 1990 to 2000) 
Adjusted Dow Jones Industrial Average is derived by dividing the original index by 3，so that it is 
comparable with the other indices along time. 
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Figure VI. 
Value-Weighted Monthly Average AFD (From 1998.12 to 2003.12) 
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